By paying teachers unequally, we are failing the students who rely on them equally.

In a significant victory for the principle of equality and dignity in public employment, the Supreme Court yesterday delivered a landmark verdict in State of Nagaland vs. Amos Seb & Ors., upholding the rights of over 380 secondary school teachers in Nagaland to be paid the same salary as their colleagues performing the same duties.  The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP filed by the State of Nagaland challenging the Division Bench order giving them equal pay for equal work.

The teachers, appointed under the Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan (RMSA) in 2016, had been drawing a fixed consolidated pay of ₹31,315—far below the scale paid to other similarly placed teachers in the same schools, including previous batches hired under the very same scheme. The Supreme Court has now declared that this differential treatment violates the constitutional guarantee of equality and directed that the teachers be paid on par with their counterparts.

At stake was not just money, but something far deeper: the State’s obligation to treat all its employees with fairness, dignity, and constitutional fidelity.

Same Work, Different Pay: A Constitutional Injustice

The teachers in question were appointed through a formal and transparent recruitment process. They underwent competitive selection, held the requisite qualifications—including a Bachelor’s degree – and were placed in government schools to teach secondary classes. Yet, despite doing the same work, in many cases in the same schools and classrooms as their colleagues, they were paid significantly less.

Their peers from earlier recruitment rounds (in 2010 and 2013), performing the same job, were paid according to the full government pay scale. The only difference? The 2016 batch’s appointment orders (and post advertisement) carried a clause fixing their pay at a lower consolidated sum. There was no difference in qualifications. No difference in duties. No difference in workload. Only a difference in how they were treated.

This was a textbook case of “hostile discrimination”—a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of the laws.

Equal Pay for Equal Work: Not a Slogan, but Law

For decades, the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that equal pay for equal work is not merely a Directive Principle (under Article 39(d)), but a constitutional right rooted in Articles 14 and 16. (Barring a few decisions that may be discussed in another column, where the Court, in our humble opinion, has gone the other way and done a great disservice to fundamental rights).

In Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982), for instance, the Court declared that employees doing similar work cannot be paid differently without a rational basis. In Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P. (1986), even casual workers performing the same tasks as regular employees were held entitled to the same pay. And in State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2017), Supreme Court reaffirmed that contractual, temporary, or daily-wage employees cannot be paid less than regular employees if their work is the same in quality and quantity.

The reasoning is simple yet profound: the Constitution bars arbitrary classification. If the State creates two categories of employees with no substantive difference in function, it cannot use labels like “contractual” or “scheme-based” to justify paying one less than the other.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Amos Seb takes this principle forward and reaffirms that no employee should be penalized for when or how they were hired if the nature of their work is identical.

No Waiver of Equality

One of the arguments often raised by the State in such cases is that the employees “knew what they were signing up for.” 

That they accepted the lower salary willingly. That they signed undertakings not to demand parity.

But the Constitution does not allow anyone to bargain away their fundamental rights.

In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), the Supreme Court famously held that “there can be no estoppel against the Constitution.” In other words, no matter what a person may agree to under compulsion or lack of choice, they cannot be denied their basic rights to equality and dignity. This principle is especially vital in employment cases, where the inequality of bargaining power is stark.

The teachers in Amos Seb had no real choice. They wanted to serve. They accepted the terms because rejecting them would mean unemployment. But that acceptance cannot be used to perpetuate discrimination.

The Human Cost of Wage Inequality: 

While legal principles are important, it’s also necessary to remember the human story behind them. These teachers were not asking for special treatment. They were not demanding bonuses or promotions. They were simply asking to be treated fairly. To be paid the same as the person standing at the next blackboard, teaching the same syllabus, in the same government school.

Imagine the daily humiliation of doing equal work and yet receiving significantly less. The morale erosion. The message it sends to students about justice. The quiet indignity of knowing your labour is undervalued not because of merit, but because of an administrative accident.

In choosing to stand up, these teachers were not just fighting for themselves. They were reaffirming the idea that dignity in work requires dignity in pay. 

Fiscal Excuses Cannot Override Fundamental Rights

Governments often raise the bogey of financial burden when faced with such claims. But fiscal convenience is not a license to violate equality.

In Chandigarh Administration v. Rajni Vali (2000), the Supreme Court held that financial constraints cannot justify unequal treatment. A State cannot plead poverty while denying its employees their due. Especially not when the cost is marginal in the context of the full budget.

In Amos Seb, the State of Nagaland argued that granting pay parity would cost it around ₹10 crore annually. But this figure, as per sources, represents a mere less than 1% of the State’s expenditure—a tiny price to pay for compliance with constitutional norms and upholding education. As the Court effectively recognized, budgeting cannot become a tool for institutional discrimination.

“If you think education is expensive, you should sample ignorance. The only thing that would protect this demographic dividend from becoming a demographic disaster is EDUCATION”

A Larger Message for the Nation

This ruling is not just a win for the RMSA teachers of Nagaland. It is a clarion call to governments across India. In an era where contract appointments and scheme-based hiring have become widespread, this decision reinforces a vital truth: no matter the label, the Constitution guarantees fairness.

States that rely on differentiated pay structures—without real differences in duties or qualifications—must now revisit those arrangements. The practice of underpaying teachers, healthcare workers, and other essential staff under the guise of “contractual engagement” cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Conclusion: Justice as Parity, Not Charity

The Supreme Court’s decision in Amos Seb is a landmark reaffirmation of the moral and legal imperative of equal pay for equal work. It reasserts that public employment is not a marketplace where bargaining power dictates wages, but a sphere governed by constitutional values.

The Court has reminded the nation that equality is not just about access to jobs, but about how the State treats you once you are in them. That dignity in employment begins with fair wages. And that justice is not generosity—but parity.

As India continues to expand its welfare infrastructure and public service delivery, this decision will stand as a foundational reminder: in the world’s largest democracy, equality must mean equal work, equal dignity, and equal pay.

*Disclosure : Mr. Bharat Chugh along with his team comprising Mayank Arora, Aditya, Pushp Sharma, Pratiksha and Ankit led arguments on behalf of the 380 teachers in this case.